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	Effective Date	January 13, 2025
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1. PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this policy is to, first, ensure that Dual Use Research of Concern ("DURC"), including research involving Pathogens with Pandemic Potential ("PPP"), does not occur at Van Andel Institute ("VAI"). Second, this policy outlines how purely computational approaches to DURC (i.e., *in silico* research not subject to the "United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential" but for which the U.S. Government *encourages* institutional oversight) are to be identified, assessed, and mitigated if approved. This policy is designed to ensure compliance with federal regulations and promote responsible *in silico* dual use research practices that balance scientific advancement with the protection of national security and public safety.

2. APPLICABILITY

2.1 This policy applies to all research activities conducted at VAI that may potentially involve or use:

2.1.1 A <u>Select Agent or Toxin</u>, per 7 CFR Part 331, 9 CFR Part 121, and 42 CFR Part 73 (for convenience, Appendix A to this policy provides a list of said agents and toxins; note, however, the U.S. Government maintains the most current and authoritative list, including exceptions based on threshold amounts, pathogenicity of certain strains, etc.), OR

2.1.2 A Risk Group 3 or Risk Group 4 pathogen listed in Appendix B of the <u>NIH Guidelines for Research</u> <u>Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules</u> ("NIH Guidelines") (for convenience, Appendix A to this policy provides a list of said Risk Group 3 and 4 pathogens; note, however, the U.S. Government maintains the most current and authoritative list, including exceptions based on threshold amounts, pathogenicity of certain strains, etc.), OR

2.1.3 Any naturally occurring, bioengineered, or synthesized component of any biological agent or toxin listed in 2.1.1 or 2.1.2 capable of causing: death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind; or deleterious alteration of the environment (i.e., a "Component").

3. POLICY STATEMENT

3.1 VAI will at all times comply with the <u>United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use</u> <u>Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential</u> ("DURC/PEPP Policy").

3.2 Research requiring the on-site use of a Federal Select Agent or Toxin, or a Risk Group 3 or 4 pathogen listed in the NIH Guidelines, or a Component thereof, is not permitted at VAI unless:

3.2.1 The Federal government has explicitly identified an exception in the Select Agents and Toxins List or the NIH Guidelines (e.g., research uses amounts below established thresholds or a non-pathogenic strain), AND

3.2.2 The experimental outcomes specified in Sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.9 cannot be Reasonably Anticipated, AND

3.2.3 VAI's Manager of Environmental Health and Safety (or their designee) has approved such research.

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3.3 Strictly *in silico* research involving a Federal Select Agent or Toxin, or a Risk Group 3 or 4 pathogen listed in the NIH Guidelines, or a Component thereof, is permitted without VAI's prior approval, provided <u>none</u> of the following experimental outcomes can be Reasonably Anticipated:

3.3.1 Increase transmissibility of a pathogen within or between host species.

3.3.2 Increase the virulence of a pathogen or convey virulence to a non-pathogen.

3.3.3 Increase the toxicity of a known toxin or produce a novel toxin.

3.3.4 Increase the stability of a pathogen or toxin in the environment, or increase the ability to disseminate a pathogen or toxin.

3.3.5 Alter the host range or tropism of a pathogen or toxin.

3.3.6 Decrease the ability for a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to be detected using standard diagnostic or analytical methods.

3.3.7 Increase resistance of a pathogen or toxin to clinical and/or veterinary prophylactic or therapeutic interventions.

3.3.8 Alter a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to disrupt the effectiveness of preexisting immunity, via immunization or natural Infection, against the pathogen or toxin.

3.3.9 Enhance the susceptibility of a host population to a pathogen or toxin.

3.4 Strictly *in silico* research involving a Select Agent or Toxin, a Risk Group 3 or 4 pathogen listed in the NIH Guidelines, or a Component thereof, requires prior approval from VAI's Vice President for Research Protections and Support if <u>any</u> of the experimental outcomes listed in 3.3.1 through 3.3.9 can be reasonably anticipated.

4. DEFINITIONS

<u>DUAL USE RESEARCH</u>. Research conducted for legitimate purposes that generates knowledge, information, technologies, and/or products that could be utilized for benevolent or harmful purposes.

<u>DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN ("DURC"</u>). Life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification to pose a significant threat with potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.

<u>IN SILICO RESEARCH</u>. Scientific experiments or studies conducted or produced by means of computer modelling, simulation, and the like, including the use of artificial intelligence.

<u>LIFE SCIENCES.</u> The study or use of living organisms, viruses, or their products, including all disciplines, methodologies, and applications of biology (including, but not limited to: biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics, and pharmaceutical and biomedical research and techniques).



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<u>PATHOGEN WITH PANDEMIC POTENTIAL ("PPP").</u> A pathogen that is likely capable of wide and uncontrollable spread in a human population and would likely cause moderate to severe disease and/or mortality in humans.

<u>PATHOGEN WITH ENHANCED PANDEMIC POTENTIAL ("PEPP").</u> A type of pathogen with pandemic potential ("PPP") resulting from experiments that enhance a pathogen's transmissibility or virulence, or disrupt the effectiveness of pre-existing immunity, regardless of its progenitor agent, such that it may pose a significant threat to public health, the capacity of health systems to function, or national security. Wild-type pathogens that are circulating in or have been recovered from nature are not PEPPs but may be considered PPPs because of their pandemic potential.

<u>PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR ("PI").</u> A senior/key person responsible for proposing, designing, conducting or reporting on research and development activities.

<u>REASONABLY ANTICIPATED</u>. An assessment of an outcome such that, generally, individuals with scientific expertise relevant to the research in question would expect this outcome to occur with a non-trivial likelihood. It does not require high confidence that the outcome will definitely occur but excludes experiments in which experts would anticipate the outcome to be technically possible, but highly unlikely.

<u>RISK ASSESSMENT</u>. A systematic process of identifying and evaluating potential risks associated with DURC, including risks related to security, biosafety, public health, and ethical considerations.

<u>RISK MITIGATION PLAN</u>. A plan developed to manage and reduce the potential risks associated with DURC, which may include modifications to research methodologies, containment measures, communication strategies, and oversight mechanisms.

5. PERFORMANCE MATERIALS - N/A

6. HIGH LEVEL PROCEDURES

6.1 Initial Identification and Notification

Principal Investigators are responsible for ensuring that research requiring the on-site use of a Select Agent or Toxin, or a Risk Group 3 or 4 pathogen listed in the NIH Guidelines, or a Component thereof, does not occur in their labs.

PIs are responsible for immediately notifying the Vice President for Research Protections and Support ("VPRPS") of any plans to engage in *in silico* research that (a) involves an agent or toxin identified in Section 2, or a Component thereof, and (b) can be reasonably anticipated to result in one or more of the experimental outcomes identified in Section 3.3.

The PI's notification must identify which agents or toxins listed in Section 2 or Component thereof will be involved in their planned research, which experimental outcome(s) identified in Section 3.3 can be reasonably anticipated, and how their planned research may result in the identified experimental outcome(s).

PIs may not initiate *in silico* research subject to the prior approval requirements of this policy without first receiving said approval.

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6.2 Policy Determination

The VPRPS will review the proposed research to determine if it falls within the scope of this policy, consulting with VAI's Institutional Biosafety Committee, Export Controls Committee, and others as needed.

6.3 Risk Assessment

If the VPRPS determines that the research in question is subject to the prior approval requirements of this policy, the VPRPS in consultation with other experts as needed will evaluate the potential benefits and risks of the research, the potential for misuse, the likelihood of harmful applications, and the potential magnitude of harm. When available, the VPRPS will use appropriately modified federal guidelines and risk assessment frameworks to guide their evaluation.

The VPRPS will endeavor to provide the PI with a written notice within 60 days of receiving the initial notification, informing them of whether the proposed *in silico* research may proceed and, if so, under what conditions.

6.4 Risk Mitigation

If the VPRPS determines that the research in question may proceed, the VPRPS will work with the PI and IBC to develop and implement a Risk Mitigation Plan that is informed by the VPRPS's assessment of risks and anticipated benefits. Mitigation strategies may include but are not limited to modifications to research protocols, increased security protocols (e.g., an export control technology control plan), collaboration with relevant government agencies, and plans that ensure the responsible sharing and communication of research results and datasets related to the biological agents and toxins involved in the research.

Pls must provide their written acceptance and agreement to follow the Risk Mitigation Plan before research subject to the Risk Mitigation Plan may commence and all subsequent research must be conducted in accordance with the approved plan.

6.5 Communication and Reporting

PIs must communicate the findings of *in silico* research approved under this policy in a responsible manner and in compliance with the approved Risk Mitigation Plan.

6.6 Monitoring and Reporting

PIs conducting approved *in silico* research must submit annual reports to the VPRPS, outlining project progress, any changes in risk assessment, and updates on risk mitigation measures no later than 30 days after the end of each project year.

If, during the course of the research, new information or developments suggest an increased risk, the PI must promptly notify the VPRPS. The VPRPS will re-evaluate the risk assessment and collaborate with the PI to implement additional risk mitigation measures if necessary.

6.7 Non-Compliance

PIs are responsible for complying with this policy and any approved Risk Mitigation Plans, reporting any deviations, and promptly informing the VPRPS of any new information or developments that could impact the assessment of risks associated with their research.

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Non-compliance with this policy or an approved Risk Mitigation Plan may result in suspension or termination of the research project, disciplinary action up to and including termination, or other appropriate institutional responses.

6.8 Education and Training

PIs will ensure that laboratory personnel (i.e., those under the supervision of laboratory leadership, including graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, research technicians, laboratory staff, and visiting scientists) receive training on the requirements of any approved Risk Mitigation Plans.

7. REFERENCES

- 7.1 Select Agents and Toxins
- 7.2 NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules
- 7.3 <u>United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with</u> <u>Enhanced Pandemic Potential</u>

8. HISTORY

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Appendix A: Select Agents and Toxins and Risk Group 3 and Risk Group 4 Pathogens from the NIH Guidelines (as of 11/21/2024)

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- 1. Abrin
- 2. Absetterov virus
- 3. African horse sickness virus
- 4. African swine fever virus
- Avian influenza highly pathogenic strains, H5N1 strains within the Goose/Guangdong/96-like H5 lineage (HPAI H5N1)
- 6. Bacillus anthracis
- 7. Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain
- 8. Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis
- 9. Bartonella
- 10. Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium
- 11. Botulinum neurotoxins
- 12. Brucella abortus
- 13. Brucella melitensis
- 14. Brucella suis
- 15. Burkholderia mallei
- 16. Burkholderia pseudomallei
- 17. Central European encephalitis virus
- 18. Chapare virus
- 19. Chikungunya virus
- 20. Classical swine fever virus
- 21. Coccidioides immitis
- 22. Coniothyrium glycines (formerly Phoma glycinicola and Pyrenochaeta glycines)
- Conotoxins (Short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence X1CCX2PACGX3X4X5X6CX7)
- 24. Coxiella burnetii
- 25. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
- 26. Diacetoxyscirpenol
- 27. Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus

- 28. Ebola virus
- 29. Flexal
- 30. Foot-and-mouth disease virus
- 31. Francisella tularensis
- 32. Goat pox virus
- 33. Guanarito virus
- 34. Hanta virus including Hantaan virus
- 35. Hanzalova virus
- 36. Hendra virus (Equine Morbillivirus)
- 37. Herpesvirus simiae (Herpes B virus or Monkey B virus)
- 38. Histoplasma capsulatum
- 39. Histoplasma capsulatum var. duboisii
- 40. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) types 1 and 2
- 41. Human T cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV) types 1 and 2
- 42. Hypr virus
- 43. Influenza viruses 1918-1919 H1N1 (1918 H1N1), human H2N2 (1957-1968), Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments (Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)
- 44. Japanese encephalitis virus
- 45. Junín virus
- 46. Kumlinge virus
- 47. Kyasanur Forest disease virus
- 48. Lassa virus
- 49. Lujo virus
- 50. Lumpy skin disease virus
- 51. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) (neurotrophic strains)
- 52. Machupo virus
- 53. Marburg virus
- 54. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)



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- 55. Monkeypox virus
- 56. Mycobacterium bovis (except BCG strain)


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- 57. Mycobacterium tuberculosis
- 58. Mycoplasma capricolum
- 59. Mycoplasma mycoides
- 60. Newcastle disease virus
- 61. Nipah virus
- 62. Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus
- 63. Orientia tsutsugamushi (was R. tsutsugamushi)
- 64. Pasteurella multocida type B -"buffalo" and other virulent strains
- 65. Peronosclerospora philippinensis (P. sacchari)
- 66. Peste des petits ruminants virus
- 67. Ralstonia solanacearum
- 68. Rathayibacter toxicus
- 69. Ricin
- 70. Rickettsia akari, R. australis, R. canada, R. conorii, R. prowazekii, R. rickettsia, R. siberica, R. typhi (R. mooseri)
- 71. Rift Valley fever virus
- 72. Rinderpest virus
- 73. Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus
- 74. Sabia virus
- 75. SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
- 76. SARS-CoV/SARS-CoV-2 chimeric viruses resulting from any deliberate manipulation of SARS-CoV-2 to incorporate nucleic acids coding for SARS-CoV virulence factors
- 77. Saxitoxin
- 78. Sclerophthora rayssiae
- 79. Semliki Forest virus
- 80. Sheep pox virus
- 81. Simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV)
- 82. Staphylococcal enterotoxins (subtypes A,B,C,D,E)
- 83. Swine vesicular disease virus
- 84. Synchytrium endobioticum

- 85. T-2 toxin
- 86. Tetrodotoxin
- 87. Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses: Far Eastern subtype
- 88. Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses: Siberian subtype
- 89. Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) agents (Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease and kuru agents)
- 90. Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
- 91. Variola minor virus (Alastrim)
- 92. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
- 93. Xanthomonas oryzae
- 94. Yellow fever virus
- 95. Yersinia pestis

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Appendix B: Policy Decision Tree



* See Appendix A.

** See EHS for guidance on exceptions.

*** See Section 3.3 of policy.